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The complexity of the intricate relationships linking 
European Union (EU) member states as well as the EU 
institutions and their member states appears to have been 
misunderstood in the United Kingdom (UK) at the time of 
the June 2016 referendum.  If information is indeed power, 
its current unavailability is a concern, given that the UK 
government’s plans to remain firmly embedded within the 
European Research Area (ERA) or the Erasmus Plus 
programme are largely unknown to the UK’s 162 higher 
education institutions (HEIs) in receipt of public funding 
(2016-17). In what can be described as a game of high 
politics between the EU and the UK government, the fate of 
research and higher education collaboration will be sealed 
by high-level inter-governmental agreements decided 
behind closed doors.  
This policy brief argues that unless a (re)new(ed) EU-UK 
partnership in research and higher education is signed off as 
soon as possible, the UK’s science and higher education 
sectors will suffer from a lack of connectivity to EU partners, 
whether with regard to research collaboration or mobility. 
More uncertainty and delays will only further damage the 
research output of all EU universities, and diminish mobility 
opportunities for students and staff, while isolating the UK 
from its region. In order to prevent such an unfortunate 
scenario for British and European science, agreeing as soon 
as possible – and independently from the broader, final 
high-level Brexit negotiations – an EU-UK research and 
higher education deal, including at the very least ‘associate 
country’ status for the UK, is of the essence. There are 16 
associated countries to the current research framework 
programme, Horizon 2020 (2014-2020), including Israel, 
Norway and Switzerland. Association is a mechanism 
whereby legal entities (for example universities) from 
associated countries can participate under the same 
conditions as legal entities from EU member states. It should 
be noted that association to Horizon 2020 takes place 
through the conclusion of an International Agreement 
between the EU and the associated partners, and that under 
the current association rules, an associated member has no 
voting rights (Papatsiba & Highman 2017: 2).  
 
 
Executive Summary 
> Continuity and certainty are crucial to excellent 
scientific research, which builds on decades of 
fruitful relationships and networks between 
European partners.  
> Following the withdrawal of the UK from the 
Union in March 2019, the eligibility of UK 
researchers and universities to access EU research 
funds will be at risk.  
> Either formal association, or an arrangement of 
similar ambition in the area of research and 
innovation is crucial to maintain continuity. 
> Should there be no agreement, additional UK 
research funding must be agreed upon at a 
national level and match any projected EU 
increase for the 9th Framework Programme (2021-
2027). 
> UK government funding should be ring fenced and 
remain available regardless of potential changes in 
government. 
> Because cross-border collaborative  applications 
to EU grants are time consuming, any further delay 
is damaging to the wider European research and 
science community as well as to the development 
of the European Research Area. 
> An urgent solution is of the essence, as an EU-UK 
partnership in research and higher education is 
already behind schedule.  
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Eligibility of UK partners for the EU research & innovation 
programmes 
The intertwined relationships between EU members and EU 
institutions are particularly evident in research and higher 
education, where the UK is a net beneficiary of the EU 
Research & Development (R&D) budget, with several of its 
universities ranking among the top performers (see Table 1). 
Articles 165 and 166 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union give power to the EU to operate as a major 
player in supplementing and supporting EU member states’ 
higher education and vocational training policy. With regard 
to research and technological development, Articles 179-190 
give the EU a steering role in adopting and implementing 
multiannual framework programmes.  
Table 1: Number of project participations and EU contribution by 
higher education institution  
Legal name EU 
contribution 
(EUR) 
Project 
participations 
1. University of Cambridge  225,841,125 361 
2. University of Oxford  222,553,340 337 
3. University College 
London (UCL)  
216,453,342 342 
4. Imperial College London 158,775,353 263 
5. Delft University of 
Technology  
142,836,333 238 
6. University of 
Copenhagen 
142,812,416 295 
7. Catholic University of 
Leuven (KU Leuven) 
138,331,426 262 
8. University of Edinburgh 137,962,066 209 
9. Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology in Lausanne 
(EPFL) 
130,526,304 206 
10. Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology in Zurich 
(ETH Zurich) 
108,202,036 213 
Source: European Commission, Participant Portal H2020 Projects, 27 
February 2018. 
The potential damage is not limited to those top Horizon 
2020 performers. They are only the tip of the iceberg. The 
percentage of EU research income as a proportion of total 
research income received is particularly alarming at some 
mid- or lower ranked universities, with more than 40 
institutions with dependency ratios above 20 per cent (see 
Table 2, Technopolis 2017: 20). While the ‘Oxfords’ and 
‘Cambridges’ may be able to soften the blow thanks to their 
recognised international brands, this will certainly not be the 
case for all UK universities. A much larger segment of the UK 
higher education sector is at risk, one whose graduates are 
under-represented in Westminster and within the UK 
government, and it is the latter that has most to lose. 
 
 
Table 2: The 10 HEIs that received most income from EU 
government bodies as a proportion of total research income, in £ 
thousands 
1. Goldsmiths College (University of 
London) 
£3,371 61% 
2. Middlesex University £2,532 51% 
3. University of South Wales £2,271 41% 
4. Birmingham City University £1,033 40% 
5. Anglia Ruskin University £1,324 40% 
6. Aston University  £5,589 39% 
7. Bangor University  £8,306 38% 
8. Sheffield Hallam University £2,811 35% 
9. University of Wolverhampton £1,040 35% 
10. Coventry University £3,271 33% 
 Source: Technopolis 2017. 
 
The European Commission has made it clear that it will not 
fund UK-based researchers or universities and research 
organisations beyond the exit date of the UK in March 2019, 
hence before the end of Horizon 2020, should no deal have 
been reached. Since this a potential outcome, it is worth 
pondering on the following: “if the United Kingdom 
withdraws from the EU during the grant period without 
concluding an agreement with the EU ensuring in particular 
that British applicants continue to be eligible, you will cease 
to be eligible to receive EU funding (while continuing, where 
possible, to participate) or be required to leave the project on 
the basis of Article 50 of the grant agreement” (Horizon 2020 
Participant Portal website, added on 06/10/2017). 
Although the UK Treasury has committed to underwrite 
funding for approved Horizon 2020 projects applied for 
before the UK leaves the EU in March 2019, research 
collaboration relies on interaction, consistency and trust 
forged over long timeframes. While evidence of UK partners 
being asked not to join or leave current research consortia is 
either anecdotal or currently not available, there is evidence 
that UK coordinating or leadership positions are jeopardised.  
All this means that the UK has less than a year to negotiate 
and ratify an international agreement or treaty with the EU in 
higher education, research, and innovation, in order to 
remain eligible for EU research funding, research 
collaboration and networking for the rest of Horizon 2020 
and its successor programme. 
Erasmus Plus 
Beyond research and innovation funding, Erasmus Plus, the 
EU’s all-encompassing programme to support education, 
training, youth and sport in Europe (2014-20), with an 
allocated budget of €14.7 billion, provides a successful 
framework for student and staff mobility, and offers 
opportunities for UK universities to increase their 
connections and competitiveness. The enrichment of the 
overall student experience that is provided by Erasmus Plus 
is difficult to quantify but vital to the diversity of UK 
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campuses, as is the added value of better language skills. 
Alternative mobility schemes will have to be devised, and 
while ‘going global’ sounds appealing, it should not be 
assumed that the demand for it exists within the UK-based 
student body. Already now, intra-European mobility remains 
a privilege for only a minority because of the associated costs. 
Future opportunities in Australia, New Zealand and North 
America will be more expensive, and will not benefit from EU 
financial support towards the cost of living abroad.  
Some UK universities are already taking it onto themselves to 
create small informal European networks for enhanced 
research and mobility collaboration, and putting aside 
mobility scholarships, but many universities do not have the 
resources to single-handedly replace a pan-European 
mobility scheme of the likes of the Erasmus Plus programme 
with their own initiatives. Exchange agreements are usually 
based on the principle of reciprocity, and students on both 
sides of the exchange benefit from EU-funded monthly 
allowances (around £250-£300), on top of tuition fee waivers. 
Should the UK not participate in Erasmus Plus, it will be a case 
not only of funding outgoing UK-based students, but of 
finding ways to enable EU-based students to still somehow 
access similar financial support in order to study at a UK-
based university. It is unlikely this will be funded by the UK 
government.  
In short, Erasmus Plus offers a supportive framework to 
nurture exchanges, with its own substantial budget enabling 
for a reciprocal flow of students and for the administration of 
these exchanges. Without such financial support, UK 
universities will have to draw from their own resources, both 
financial and human, to recreate similar arrangements at a 
higher cost. 
Avoiding falling behind the EU’s research spending   
The European Commission’s “Investing in the European 
future we want” (2017) clearly recommended to dramatically 
increase the budget of the future 9th Framework Programme 
for research and innovation, the successor seven-year 
programme to Horizon 2020. While the High Level Group 
chaired by former Director General of the World Trade 
Organisation and European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy 
recommended the research and innovation budget be 
doubled (to 160 billion EUR), it also identifies the absolute 
minimum requirement for the next seven-year research and 
innovation budget to be in the region of at least 120 billion 
EUR in current prices, which is equivalent to an overall 
increase of 66.7%. The report explains that this is because the 
future EU research budget should maintain the average 
annual growth rate of Horizon 2020 (the compound annual 
growth rate is around 6.5% in current prices), taking the 
budget foreseen for the programme’s final year as a starting 
point (expected to be EUR 13 billion in 2020).  
The UK government has pledged to increase investment in 
research and development by 20% by 2020-2021 (Her 
Majesty’s Government 2017a: 29). Even if this promise is 
upheld, it falls short of the expected increase in the EU 
research budget, as explained above through the compound 
annual growth rate. There is strong political momentum 
behind the recommendation of the High Level Group, as 
demonstrated through the Rome Declaration that was signed 
by the leaders of 27 member states. The likelihood of the first 
recommendation being implemented is high, and if that is not 
the case, the absolute minimum requirement will surely be 
respected. It should be noted that Theresa May was the only 
EU leader that did not attend the commemoration of the 60th 
anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, which produced the Rome 
Declaration containing a reflection on the state of the EU and 
the future of the integration process. 
Research is a hugely costly enterprise, and without 
substantial investment from the part of the UK government, 
both the quantity and quality of UK research outputs are at 
risk of falling behind, should the UK not succeed in 
maintaining access to EU research funds, and perhaps even 
more crucially in the long-term, access to EU research 
networks. 
Association status for the UK 
What can be done to allow the UK to participate in the ERA 
and Erasmus Plus? Association to the Framework 
Programmes has been used by the EU as an instrument of soft 
power, and has previously focused primarily on capacity-
building in the European neighbourhood, targeting first and 
foremost European Neighbourhood Policy or candidate 
countries, with a few notable exceptions (Iceland, Norway 
and Switzerland). The UK clearly does not fit in either 
category and because of its sheer size, high success rate in 
winning awards, and refusal to recognise the free movement 
of people, a mutually beneficial and creative solution for 
collaboration must be found. This agreement must recognise 
the positive contribution of British research to European 
science, while acknowledging that European science is not 
‘business as usual’, and that the UK cannot simply expect or 
seek to secure a deal that would enable it to make a 
substantial return on its investment.  
Opening up ‘association status’ with global trading partners 
of a similar level of excellence was identified as an objective 
to be pursued by the High Level Group chaired by Lamy. 
However, at present, based on the lack of information 
provided by both the UK government and EU negotiators, it 
is impossible to predict if the UK and the EU are on a 
trajectory to become global trading partners. In fact, at least 
in the short term, quite the contrary. In a leaked memo said 
by Politico to have been provided to Chief Brexit negotiator 
Michel Barnier for a “preparatory discussion” on the 
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“framework for the future relationship”, it is revealed that 
the EU is of the opinion that because of the UK’s rejection of 
the European Court of Justice jurisdiction and issues around 
“regulatory autonomy”, it cannot be considered a 
“compatible” fit as a close trade partner (De la Baume & 
Mishcke 2017). The further emerging crisis surrounding the 
European Commission’s February 2018 Draft Withdrawal 
Agreement proposal for the Northern Ireland border will only 
mean further discussions, delay and more uncertainty. Hence 
association to the EU research and innovation programmes 
on the basis of being recognised as global trading partner is 
facing considerable bottlenecks. As such, because of the sui 
generis nature of both the UK’s departure and its future 
relationship with the EU, it may be possible that existing 
framework agreements for research and innovation, such as 
association, are unhelpful. Hence, looking beyond existing 
partnerships and models may become a more useful exercise 
than trying to replicate existing arrangements. However, this 
demands frank and transparent discussions from both sides, 
a capacity to look beyond national self-interest and domestic 
point-scoring, as well as an ability to depart from a monolithic 
standpoint and engage in creative policy thinking.  
In addition, the UK, by being geographically speaking a 
European country, is not necessarily the primary target of the 
Union’s new policy to open European research excellence to 
the world, which seeks to expand the EU’s soft power via 
science globally. Indeed, the new proposed policy is 
considered a remedy to the current narrow geographical 
basis of EU research and innovation programmes, and 
explicitly justified as a means to widen the currently 
regionally biased scope of research and innovation 
excellence, so that it is “not confined to a particular part of 
the world” (European Commission 2017: 21), that currently 
being the greater European region and its immediate 
neighbourhood. Canada and Australia were explicitly 
mentioned as the partners of choice under this new EU 
strategy. Opening European research excellence to the UK 
would only further emphasise the current regional bias of EU 
research and innovation programmes. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The “ambitious and close partnership with the EU” referred 
to in the UK’s government “Collaboration in science and 
innovation: a future partnership paper” (2017: 8) should be 
agreed upon immediately, providing certainty for the higher 
education sector. Applications for a Horizon 2020 grant are 
time-consuming. The British Academy has estimated that 
many collaborative research grant applications in the arts and 
humanities and the social sciences can take more than 18 
months to complete (2017). Therefore, an agreement should 
have already been reached six months ago. Just like business, 
research and higher education operate in a space where 
certainty is vital.   
Nonetheless, certainty in the UK is today a scarce if not 
inexistent resource, where nothing is decided until 
everything is. Both the quantity and quality of UK bids for EU 
research grants will suffer because of the time restraints that 
will de facto be placed on the British academic community. 
Moreover, the enduring lack of certainty regarding principal 
investigator status for UK researchers will lead to fewer 
applications being made. It should be emphasised that this is 
not a prediction or an economic analysis, it is already the 
reality. The proportion of EU projects coordinated by British 
research teams fell sharply after the referendum, from 16.9% 
in 2016 to 12.6% of all funding in 2017, dropping behind 
Germany (Matthews 2017). 
The UK’s “future partnership paper” of September 2017 
acknowledges that associated countries have no voting rights 
over the thematic directions of the EU Work Programmes nor 
can they shape funding allocation rationales. There is a need 
for more creative policy thinking on both sides to see how the 
relationship can be mutually beneficial, and not be a case of 
cherry-picking which sectors have the highest return on 
investment for one side. The UK has been a strong advocate 
for funding instruments based purely on excellence. Without 
the UK, those member states currently supporting an 
approach focusing only on excellence will have lost their most 
vocal supporter. However, should UK higher education 
institutions suddenly be ineligible to compete for EU research 
funds, those in other member countries could see an increase 
in their success rate for EU grants.  
EU and UK HEIs need to be further included in Brexit-related 
negotiations, as the nature of a future EU-UK relationship in 
research and science can only be properly implemented with 
the support and input of both the academic and professional 
staff working in HEIs, while also including the student voice. 
Research outputs ultimately generate societal benefits while 
contributing to solving global societal challenges. Should a 
deal be negotiated behind closed doors, without a concerted 
consultation of the relevant stakeholders beyond politicians 
and policy-makers, it would face an immediate 
implementation gap detrimental to research, science and 
society. In the UK, where British society still remains divided 
over Brexit, the government is keen to distance itself from its 
universities, perceived to be bastions of implacable 
remainers. However, this attitude will cripple the 
government’s capacity to achieve a successful deal, and 
further undermine the value of research and higher 
education in the UK, and the people who make these sectors 
the success stories they are today.     
Without a substantial UK contribution to the EU’s R&D 
budget, continuing access of UK universities to EU research 
grants could face legitimacy concerns, at a time where 
competition between HEIs is growing and their role in driving 
national economies is key. It will ultimately be a matter for 
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EU member states, and the EU taxpayer, to decide whether 
they wish to continue contributing to funding research 
conducted outside the EU, and enable the ‘Oxfords’ and 
‘Cambridges’ to carry on remaining the most successful EU 
grant recipients. Without a substantial UK contribution, it is 
unlikely this will become a popular venture with European 
publics, as these universities are already the wealthiest of all 
European public universities. However, whatever their 
benefits, ‘payments’ to Brussels are hugely unpopular with 
the current UK government, and will be scrutinised and 
negotiated at great lengths, losing more valuable time. 
Research and higher education are thus becoming an 
increasingly threatened hostage of political negotiations. In 
the meantime, cutting-edge learning, research, and science, 
for which the economic and societal benefits are evident, are 
losing out.   
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